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1. Introduction 
Rapid and prolonged economic development and the globalization of the Chinese 
economy have dramatically changed the structure of agricultural production and farm 
management in rural China. In coastal areas, such as Shandong and Zhejiang provinces, 
many agribusiness enterprises that possessed abundant management resources began in the 
mid-1990s to integrate farmers through contract farming to produce standardized, 
high-quality, and safe products, covering all processes from cultivation and processing to 
marketing (Lingohr 2007, Miyata et al. 2009, Lingohr-Wolf 2011). Central and local 
governments in China evaluated these attempts by the agribusiness enterprises highly and 
initiated a new agricultural policy called “Agro-industrialization” (nongye chanyehua) in 
the late 1990s. According to this policy, the establishment of agricultural conglomerates 
through contract farming is expected to increase the profitability of agricultural products 
and improve the economic standards of rural people (World Bank 2006, MoA eds. 2008). 
It has been thought that small farmers in developing counties tend to be inferior to 
agribusiness enterprises in terms of bargaining power on pricing and contract enforcement 
(Key and Runsten 1999, Singh 2002). In particular, a large number of small farmers engage 
in agricultural production in China.1 Due to the transaction costs involved in monitoring 
and managing numerous, geographically dispersed, small farmers, agribusiness companies 
might be reluctant to engage in contract farming with small farmers. 
However, small farmers are not necessarily excluded from vertical coordination with 
agribusiness enterprises in developing countries, and the inclusion of small farmers has 
been extensively reported (Reardon et al. 2009, Barrett et al. 2012, Abebe et al. 2013). This 
reflects the fact that small farmers are able and willing to follow the higher labor-intensive 
field management practices needed by these integrators, and they can reduce transaction 
costs by forming effective agricultural cooperatives (Reardon et al. 2009, Bolwig et al. 
2009, Fischer and Qaim 2012). The inclusion of small farmers through the establishment of 
agricultural cooperatives is widely practiced in China. Since the 1990s, a significant 
number of agricultural cooperatives, called Farmer’s Professional Cooperatives (nongmin 
zhuanye hezuoshe, hereafter FPCs), have been established by large farmers, agribusiness 
enterprises, and local governments to reduce conflict as well as to improve the balance of 
benefit and risk between agribusiness enterprises and farmers. 
                                                   
1 According to Second Chinese Agricultural Census conducted in 2006 and the Rural Social Economic 
Survey, the number of farm households engaged in agricultural production totaled 200.16 million 
households in 2006, and the average areas of cultivated land in 2006 and 2011 were 0.577 and 0.598 
hectares per household, respectively. 
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FPCs are a new type of agricultural cooperative organization that are expected to 
mediate between the agribusiness enterprises and farmers in terms of diffusion of 
agricultural technologies, monitoring of farm cultivation, procurement of farm products, 
and redistribution of the profits produced by the differentiated products. The establishment 
of FPCs is intimately related to the malfunction of formal agricultural extension 
organizations due to entrenchment of budget allocation as well as lack of knowledge 
regarding more commercialized products after the introduction of the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) for agricultural production (Hu and Huang 2001, Huang et al. 
2009, Hu et al. 2012).  
Since the promulgation of the “Law of Farmers Professional Cooperatives” on July 1, 
2007, FPCs have developed rapidly. A total of 111,000 FPCs were registered at the Ministry 
of Commerce in 2008, rising to 982,700 organizations in 2013. During this period, the 
number of farm households participating in FPCs also increased from 12 million to 74 
million, constituting 28.5% of all rural households (China Agricultural Development 
Report (various issues), MoA eds, 2011, Ministry of Agriculture HP, 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/, Feb.13th, 2013). 
Regarding the development of FPCs, an increasing number of investigations are 
examining the ability of FPCs to overcome small farmers’ inherent inefficiency regarding 
adoption of new technology and pricing of their products. The World Bank (2006) and Shen 
et al. (2007) comprehensively reviewed the characteristics of FPCs and clarified the 
importance of FPCs for facilitating agro-industrialization in China. Based on panel data 
collected from villages across China, Deng et al. (2010) revealed that policy initiatives, 
such as the issue of official documents, financial support, and tax exemption, significantly 
promote the establishment of FPCs within villages. Jia and Huang (2011) and Jia et al. 
(2012) examined the determinants of marketing channels or contract farming adopted by 
FPCs. These studies revealed that the adoption of modern marketing channels such as direct 
sales to supermarkets is positively related to transactions with government-driven 
agribusiness, and that the implementation of contract farming correlates positively with the 
scale of production by FPCs. 
On the other hand, most of the existing literature focusing on specific FPCs appears to 
focus less on the endogeneity of participation in FPCs, instead conducting simple 
comparisons of agricultural profits or household income between FPC participants and 
non-participants. The exceptional studies include those by Miyata et al. (2009) and Ito et al. 
(2012). Miyata et al. (2009) employed a Heckman selection-correction model to compare 
contract and non-contract growers of apples and onions in Shandong province. Focusing on 
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a watermelon-producing cooperative in Nanjing, Ito et al. (2012) employed the propensity 
score matching (PSM) method to reveal that the treatment effect of participation in a 
cooperative is highly heterogeneous and is significant only for small-scale farms. 
However, these studies focus on China’s relatively developed coastal areas. Few 
studies emphasize the functions of FPCs in China’s less developed inland provinces, where 
local farmers tend to depend more heavily on agricultural income, and the introduction of 
new varieties seems to be more crucial for enhancing household economic welfare. In 
addition, although most of the farmers face the decision of whether to introduce new 
agricultural varieties, existing studies focus less on the disparities between traditional 
farmers, who continue to cultivate traditional varieties, and innovative farmers, who have 
introduced new varieties. These comparisons seem to misevaluate the effects of 
implementing new varieties as well as FPC participation. 
Thus, the contributions of this study are twofold. First, I focus on the less-developed 
inland areas in China to examine the effects of FPC participation using parametric and 
non-parametric estimation methods. A farm household survey was conducted in a 
less-developed inland county, namely Xinjiang in Shanxi province, a known center for 
vegetable production in inland China. Since the mid-2000s, local governments have 
strongly promoted the establishment of FPCs as well as the introduction of vegetable 
production to enhance local farmers’ living standards. The process of agro-industrialization 
in this area is closely analogous to that of Sichuan, which was examined by Lingohr (2007). 
Therefore, a case study in Xinjiang County can be regarded as a good example to 
investigate the mechanisms of economic development through agro-industrialization in 
inland China. 
Second, I estimate not only the treatment effect of participation in FPCs by comparing 
participant and non-participant households but also explore the effect of initiating vegetable 
production by comparing the households that continue to cultivate traditional varieties and 
those that began cultivating greenhouse vegetables through PSM. I concentrate on 
vegetables, especially eggplant cultivation, because existing studies on FPCs have tended to 
be biased toward special varieties, such as watermelons, apples, honey, and Chinese 
gooseberries. Cultivating these products require lump sum investments and are less closely 
relevant to traditional cultivation techniques. On the other hand, vegetable cultivation itself 
is familiar to local farmers, but lump sum investments, such as greenhouse construction, 
appear to be necessary to cultivate high-quality eggplant during winter and spring seasons. 
Thus, in comparing famers according to whether they initiated vegetable cultivation it is 
also necessary to identify the determinants of commencing vegetable cultivation. In order 
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to implement multilateral comparisons, I have introduced a unique sampling design to 
classify farmers into three categories; FPC participants, non-participants but mainly 
engaged in vegetable cultivation, and traditional farmers principally cultivating grain crops. 
This sampling design enables me to distinguish the effects of FPC participation from those 
of vegetable cultivation. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of 
agricultural production and FPC activities in Xinjiang county. Section 3 presents the 
estimation framework used to discuss the impacts of FPC participation as well as the 
implementation of vegetable cultivation. Section 4 employs parametric and nonparametric 
measures to perform an econometric analysis of those impacts. Section 5 summarizes the 
results and discusses the policy implications for FPC development and 
agro-industrialization in China.  
 
 
2. Description of surveyed area and sampling methods 
2.1. Overview of agriculture in Xinjiang county2 
Xinjiang County, located in the southeast of Shanxi Province, is a rural county famous 
for wood-block prints and old castles. Its economy was mainly dependent on traditional 
agricultural production, such as grain (wheat and maize) and cotton cultivation, as well as 
tourism. Faced with stagnating grain prices since the early 1990s, the county government 
began promoting the structural adjustment of agriculture from traditional products to more 
commercialized varieties, such as eggplants, cucumbers, and tomatoes, at the end of the 
1990s, earlier than other areas in Shanxi province. Due to persistent effort by farmers as 
well as extensive support from the local government, the county became a major vegetable 
cultivating area by the end of the 2000s.  
Lately, agriculture in Xinjiang has principally depended on vegetable cultivation. 
Vegetables cultivated in the county are distributed not only within Shanxi Province but also 
sold in adjoining large cities, such as Xi’an (Shaanxi Province) and Luoyang (Henan 
Province). The county is officially acknowledged as one of the “Top 10 fruit and vegetable 
production cities in China” and a “National food safety model county,” and the vegetables 
                                                   
2 The descriptions in Section 2.1 are based on field interviews with the staff of the Bureau of 
Agricultural Management, the cadre of village committees, and the managers of FPCs in Xinjiang 
conducted in June 2012 by the author. I also refer to the website of the Xinjiang County government 
(http://www.jiangzhou.gov.cn/index.htm) and the website of Chinese Agricultural Management 
Information (http://www.caein.com). 
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produced in the county are certified as “Xinzhou Green Brand” by the provincial 
government. According to a document published by the government in 20103, vegetables 
are planted across 11,000 hectares, covering approximately 32% of total cultivated land in 
the county. Of this total, the area devoted to greenhouse vegetables reached 5,240 hectares. 
Vegetable production totals 543 thousand metric tons, worth 718 million yuan, and 
constitutes nearly 60% of the whole crop-raising value of the county. A total of 34,000 
farmers are primarily cultivating vegetables in the county, constituting 55% of total rural 
households. 
The total number of FPCs established has increased rapidly with the development of 
vegetable cultivation and the intensive support offered for the establishment of FPCs by the 
local government since the mid 2000s. By 2011, a total of 369 FPCs existed in the county. 
Of these, 121 cooperatives were registered as vegetable FPCs, the greatest of all types of 
cooperative. FPC membership in Xinjiang tends to be restricted to within villages, and 
several FPCs can be established in a single village. Approximately 8,900 households were 
official members of an FPC, constituting nearly 14% of total households in Xinjiang’s rural 
areas in June 20114. Along with the development of agro-industrialization and FPCs in the 
county, transactions involving farmland are also becoming more prevalent. Specifically, 
28.7% of all cultivated land is rented out, and 38.0% of all farmers are engaged in farmland 
transactions5. One of the principal reasons for increased farmland transaction is to merge 
adjoining farmlands to enable farmers to construct a greenhouse. In such a situation, as will 
be discussed below, FPCs and the village committee tend to mediate between farmers to 
facilitate land transactions fairly as well as effectively. 
 
 
2.2. Sampling design 
A questionnaire survey was conducted among rural households in December 2011, 
concerning 2010 data with international joint research between IDE and the Rural 
Development Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, to examine the effects of 
                                                   
3 “The Five-year Agricultural Development Plan (2011–2015) for the ‘A Product from Every Village 
Campaign’ in Xinjiang County” (Xinjiang Xian Yi-cun Yi-pin Wu nian guihua (2011 zhi 2015)) published 
by Xinjiang county government in April 2011 (http://www.jiangzhou.gov.cn/index.htm). 
4 Data on FPCs are based on an interview with the vice director of Xinjiang Bureau of Agricultural 
Management held in May 2012. According to the Chinese Agricultural Management Information website 
(http://www.caein.com/), FPCs now total 514 cooperatives, containing 175 vegetable cooperatives, and 
participant numbers reached nearly 12,600 households at the end of October 2013. 
5 The amount of cultivated land rented across all of China is nearly 18 million hectares, constituting 
21.5% of the country’s total cultivated land at the end of 2012 (People’s Daily, March 5th, 2012). 
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vegetable FPCs on farm income. Since most FPCs in Xinjiang county restrict their 
membership to village members, two villages were selected where economic conditions, 
such as income level and agricultural conditions, are almost identical, along with highly 
similar cropping patterns of vegetables (mainly eggplant) and FPC management features.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Surveyed Villages and FPCs in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s Village and FPC survey and field interview conducted on May 2012. 
 
The basic characteristics of surveyed villages and FPCs are shown in Table 1. The 
total numbers of households and areas of farmland are almost the same for the two villages, 
and the principal products and cropping patterns are also similar. The FPCs of the two 
sample villages were established with strong support from the village committees at almost 
the same time: December 2008 for village No.1 and March 2009 for village No.2. FPC 
members in 2010 were 125 and 105 households, respectively, constituting 37.9% and 
34.4% of all households in each village. Most participants, 88.6 %, joined the FPC around 
2008–09. The remaining participants had entered a former farmer’s cooperative for wheat, 
which was established in July 2006 but not registered at the Industry and Commerce 
Bureau as a formal FPC, and continued as a member of the new FPCs. Participation in the 
FPCs is voluntary and withdrawal is unrestricted.  
We have randomly chosen nearly 100 households from each village according to the 
probability proportional to the population share, using the lists of FPC members for 
participants and resident registration data for non-participants. Table 2 presents the 
Village No.1 Village No.2
Total number of household 305 296
Total number of population (person ) 1,214 1,396
Total size of farmland (ha) 160 173
Principal agricultural products eggplant, wheat, maize eggplant, jujube, wheat,
maize
Foundation year of FPC December 2008 March 2009
Total number of FPC participants 125 105
Registered capital of FPC (million  yuan ) 3.20 3.15
Number of full-time workers of FPC
(person ) 4 5
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distribution of sample farmers. As shown in the table, 72 households are formal members 
of FPCs cultivating vegetables (hereafter, “participants”) whereas 60 households are 
non-participants of FPCs but cultivate vegetables (hereafter, “non-participants”). Among 
vegetable-cultivating farmers, 126 farmers cultivate eggplant as a principal product, 
constituting 95% of participants, and the remaining farmers cultivate other vegetables, such 
as peppers and green peppers. As the cropping pattern of vegetable production tends to be 
affected by seasonality and market conditions, it is difficult to completely control for the 
variety of vegetables. In addition to vegetable-producing households, we also randomly 
selected 69 households who cultivate only traditional crops, such as maize, wheat, and 
cotton, (hereafter, “grain farmers”) to evaluate the ability of vegetable cultivation to 
enhance agricultural income. 
 
Table 2 Numbers of Sampled Households 
 
Source: Farm survey in Xinjiang County. 
 
The preconditions for obtaining membership in FPCs are the same in each village, 
namely to build by themselves standard greenhouses to grow vegetables, and the guidelines 
for greenhouses were specified by the county government. A standard greenhouse, called 
“winter-warm style” (dongnuan shi) covers nearly 3 mu (15 mu equals 1 hectare), and the 
total cost one of building is approximately 40,000–50,000 yuan per greenhouse6. However, 
the construction of the greenhouse itself appears not to be a major factor preventing 
vegetable farmers from participating in FPCs, because 93% of non-participants possess 
                                                   
6 Simple greenhouses made from bamboo and plastic were widespread in Xinjiang County until the end 
of the 1990s. These greenhouses cost approximately 10,000 yuan, and the required lot size was 0.7 to 0.8 
mu per greenhouse. Since the early 2000s, the construction of a new type of greenhouse, named the 
“winter-warm style”, has become widespread in this area. Constructing a “winter-warm style” 
greenhouse required the surface of the earth to be dug to a depth of nearly 70 to 80 centimeters to 
maintain temperatures in the winter. Thereafter, thick clay walls along the northern side are built along 
with bamboo frames supported by cement props to allow the greenhouse to be covered with plastic 
sheets. 
participants non-participants
Number of households 72 60 69 201
Percentage 36 30 34 100
Vegetable farmers 
Grain farmers Total
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several greenhouses used to cultivate vegetables. On the other hand, limited number (nearly 
17%) of grain farmers possess a greenhouse, thus investment in a greenhouse appears to be 
a key factor for initiating vegetable cultivation in this area. 
 
2.3. Services provided by FPCs 
Both FPCs in the surveyed villages offer a wide range of service to vegetable farmers.7 
First, the FPCs supply superior eggplant seedlings grown in FPC-owned and operated 
greenhouses. One FPC exchanges agency contracts with a major nursery business in 
Holland to cultivate eggplant seedlings. This FPC raised nearly 580,000 seedlings in 2009, 
of which 380,000 were sold to FPC participants, and the rest were distributed to eggplant 
farmers within the county8. While the other FPC began to cultivate eggplant seedlings in 
2011, it raises only a relatively limited number, only circulated among vegetable farmers 
within the village.  
Second, the FPCs make blanket orders of agricultural input materials, such as fertilizer, 
pesticides, and plastic sheets, providing them to farmers at a discount of nearly 10%. The 
FPCs directly place blanket orders with the material makers and farmers visit stores in the 
village to pick them up. 
Third, the FPCs offer free instruction in vegetable cultivation techniques through 
on-site training and lecture classes. The FPCs and village committees employ an 
agricultural technique instructor from Shouguang city (a county-level city) in Shandong 
province, which is one of the most advanced vegetable-producing areas in China. The term 
of the instructors’ contract is normally one year, and they are required to reside in the 
village and make rounds through the village to offer technical advice on vegetable 
cultivation at the request of farmers. Moreover, the instructors are also engaged in raising 
the eggplant seedlings that are distributed throughout the county. FPCs and village 
committees pay these instructors a salary of approximately 50,000 yuan per year.  
Fourth, the FPCs mainly undertake marketing activities to bargain with vegetable 
traders who come to the wholesale market located adjacent to the FPC’s offices. The 
                                                   
7 Agro technical extension centers, which are responsible for giving technical advice to farmers, also 
exist at the township level in Xinjiang, while their extension service tends to specialize in traditional 
crops, such as wheat, maize, and cotton, and their staff appears to lack knowledge of vegetable 
cultivation. According to interviews conducted with agro technical extension center staff, the total 
number of staff at the township level is restricted to a few people, thus it is difficult for the center to 
offer detailed services to vegetable-cultivating farmers. 
8 The interview with FPC representatives shows that the sale price of eggplant seedlings is the same for 
both participants and non-participants. 
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wholesale markets were constructed by village committees at nearly the same time as the 
establishment of the FPCs. In these markets, FPC staff offer a grading service for the 
agricultural products that farmers bring, and directly negotiate with the traders on behalf of 
farmers without any charges9. 
With respect to the FPCs’ services, it is noteworthy that these services’ beneficiaries 
are not necessarily restricted to FPC participants: non-participants can also enjoy these 
services without any extra charges. Non-participants are able to sell their products through 
FPCs, and can also purchase agricultural input materials at discounted prices. These 
externalities of FPCs’ services are closely related to the fact that both FPCs were founded 
by powerful supporters of village committees. Thus, it appears difficult for FPCs to exclude 
non-participant farmers from their services as they belong to the same villages10. 
The non-excludability of non-participants can be confirmed by the choice of marketing 
channels. Table 3 shows average selling prices and shares of amounts sold for each 
marketing channel for eggplants. While the participants sell nearly all eggplants via 
consignment sales to FPCs, consignment sales are an important channel for 
non-participants as well. Specifically, the latter’s share of amounts sold is 56%, nearly 14 
percent points higher than that sold through the wholesale market. This result indicates that 
consignment sales to FPCs are not restricted to participants, and a t-test yields no 
significant difference for sale prices between participants and non-participants. In addition, 
average sales prices through FPC consignment sales and in the wholesale market do not 
differ significantly for non-participants. In reality, eggplants produced by participants and 
non-participants are treated as the same brand and sold to merchants who visit the local 
wholesale market, suggesting that the FPCs have not succeeded in differentiating their 
products from those of non-participants11.  
Meanwhile, FPC participants are required to invest a specific amount of money to 
obtain stock in the FPCs, with most participants paying 500 yuan to the FPCs, which equals 
the price of one share of FPC stock. The FPC’s profits are supposed to be redistributed 
according to investment or sales amounts, but this was not actually implemented until 2011. 
After this initial investment, participants do not have to pay an annual membership fee.  
                                                   
9 In addition, the FPCs sometimes mediate between farmers and financial institutions (Rural Credit 
Cooperative, Agricultural Bank of China) to facilitate farmers’ applications for agricultural loans. 
10 In fact, according to the interview with FPC leaders, they mentioned that excluding non-members 
from the FPCs’ services was difficult because non-participants were also villagers. 
11 Although the distribution of eggplant selling price for non-participants is more concentrated around 
the average price (2.0 yuan/kg), no significant difference of selling price is observed between 
participants and non-participants using a t-test. 
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Table 3 Marketing Channels for Eggplant  
 
 
The study questionnaire asked respondents to choose (single choice) their main reason 
for participating in the FPCs. The share of respondents choosing “to ensure a marketing 
channel” was highest, constituting 36% of all participants, which indicates that the FPC’s 
marketing activities is the most important factor influencing whether to participate in the 
FPCs. Following this, the answers “to accept financial support” and “to stabilize sales price” 
were chosen by 18% and 14% of participants, respectively. According to the interviews 
with FPC representatives and participants, the participants (and some non-participants) are 
able to use credit to purchase fertilizers and pesticides offered by the FPCs, and repay the 
costs at the end of the cultivation season without interest. With regard to sale prices, 
vegetables are sold at market spot prices and the FPCs do not propose price stabilization to 
the participants. According to our survey, approximately 70% of vegetable farmers 
participated in the FPCs at the same time as initiating greenhouse vegetable cultivation. 
These results indicate that FPC participation offers a type of psychological effect for 
farmers seeking to secure marketing channels for their vegetables. 
 
 
3. Estimation Strategy and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Parametric Method 
I introduce evaluation problems in a regression framework, and assume that the 
dependent variable is the net income from vegetable cultivation or agricultural production 
to estimate the impacts of FPC participation. As suggested by Key and Runsten (1998) and 
the World Bank (2006), the impacts of contract farming and FPCs are multidimensional, 
such as offering credit and insurance for participants to cope with market imperfections, 
and reducing transaction costs associated with searches, screening, and the transfers of 
goods. However, one of the most important purposes of FPCs is to increase farmers’ 
average selling
price (yuan/kg)
share of amount
sold (%)
average selling
price (yuan/kg)
share of amount
sold (%)
Consignment sales to FPC 2.01 97 2.02 56
Consignment sales to full-time farmers 1.85 2 0
Wholesale market 2.00 2 2.04 42
Sell by themselves 0 2.10 2
Participants Non-participants
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economic well-being, and this impact appears to be summarized in farm household income. 
Thus, I focus on net income from crop or vegetable cultivation, deducting input costs (seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticide, and land rental fees, etc.), and an estimated income function (Y ) is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
                                    （1） 
 
 
where X  and β  are, respectively, vectors of exogenous variables and parameters 
(including a constant term). The “Treatment” of participation in an FPC is denoted by a 
dummy variable iD  which equals 1 if the farmer participates in an FPC and 0 otherwise. If 
participation in the FPC is conducted randomly, namely D  and  are uncorrelated, 
ordinary least squares leads to unbiased estimate of the impact of FPC participation. 
However, according to the provisions of FPC law and my interviews with the FPC, FPC 
participation appears to be determined endogenously. Specifically, more motivated and 
competent farmers are willing to join the FPC. Therefore, I assume a selection function by 
latent regression as follows:  
 
                                    （2） 
 
where the vectors Z  and Zβ  denote, respectively, exogenous variables and parameters, 
and the variables of Z  are required to overlap with X  but include at least one 
independent source of variation in D  that satisfies the conditions of the instrumental 
variables (Bratberg et al. 2002, and Cameron and Trivedi 2005). In addition, it is assumed 
that  and  are bivariate normally distributed as follows: 
 
 
                               （3） 
 
 
A reduced form agricultural income function to adjust for selection bias as well as to 
control household characteristics is estimated. The income function is then specified as 
follows: 
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                                     (4) 
where L  denotes the total amount of labor, T  denotes the total area of contracted 
farmland, K  denotes the total amount of capital for greenhouses, agricultural machines, 
and farm implements, H denotes a vector of household characteristics affecting 
agricultural productivity, and jV  is the village dummy. Parameters to be estimated are 
jφγβββα ,,,,, 321  and c . In estimating the income function, to enhance asymptotic 
efficiency (Bolwig et al. 2009), I adopt the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
method, which estimates equations (1) and (2) simultaneously, rather than the Heckman 
two-step method12.  
With regard to the instrumental variables to control endogeneity of FPC participation, 
I adopt two variables. One variable evaluates a villager’s willingness to attend villagers’ 
meetings (3 point scale; 1 = less willing, 2 = ordinal, 3 = very willing), and the other is a 
dummy variable for whether the household head is a CCP (Chinese communist party) 
member. Recent literature shows that the introduction of village democracy through direct 
election of village cadres facilitates the supply of public services, such as the construction 
of irrigation, roads, and educational facilities, and improves the income distribution among 
village households (Luo et al. 2007, 2010，Martinez-Bravo et al. 2012, Shen and Yao 2008, 
Wang and Yao 2007). Following these studies, the variable of willingness to attend villagers’ 
meetings is assumed to represent the level of recognition of village democracy and public 
services, thus the higher the degree, more inclined people will be to participate in FPCs13. 
In addition, according to previous studies (Miyata et al. 2009 and Kong et al. 2012), CCP 
members and village cadres tend to take the initiative in joining FPCs to facilitate villagers’ 
participation. As it does not directly relate to the level of vegetable cultivation technique, 
CCP status seems to be a good instrument to control endogeneity.  
 
3.2. Non-parametric Methods 
In addition to this parametric method, I examine the impacts of FPC participation as 
                                                   
12 Since the restriction of error terms seems to be too strong, I conducted Pagan-Hallt, White and 
Breusch-Pagan tests to check the homoscedasticity of error terms. The estimated results show that the 
null hypotheses are not rejected at the 10% level for most cases. Thus, the GMM procedure is not 
adopted in this article.  
13 It might be possible that the political participation by farmers is motivated by their self-interest, but as 
the services FPCs provide to farmers are relatively standardized, little scope exists to obtain extra 
benefits from the FPC by political bargaining. Thus, I can assume that willingness to attend villagers’ 
meetings is a suitable instrumental variable to control the endogeneity of participating in an FPC. 
ijjiiiii VDKTLY εφγβββα ++′+++++= iHc321ln
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well as vegetable cultivation by estimating the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) as follows:  
 
 
                                    （5） 
 
where )(⋅E denotes the expectation operator, 1iY  denotes the outcome of interest 
(vegetable or agricultural net income) for household i  participating in an FPC, and 0iY  
denotes the outcome for the same household not participating in an FPC, and D  is a 
binary indicator that equals 1 if a farmer participates in an FPC and 0 otherwise. 
In estimating ATT, I could not observe ]1[ 1 =ii DY and ]1[ 0 =ii DY  simultaneously for 
the same household, and a simple comparison between treatment and control groups 
involves a selection bias, whose magnitude is shown in ]1[]0[ 00 =−= iiii DYEDYE  if FPC 
participation is practiced non-randomly such that participation is implemented on a 
farmer’s own initiative. Thus, I introduce the program evaluation method of PSM proposed 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to estimate ATT. The method assumes that outcome is 
independent of program participation conditional on a set of observable characteristics ( W ), 
implying that )(0 WpDY ii ⊥ , where ⊥ denotes independence and )(Wp denotes a score 
representing the propensity to participate in an FPC with a set of covariates W . PSM can 
eliminate selection bias caused by observable household characteristics.14 
In order to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of bias due to 
selection-on-unobservables, such as farmers’ entrepreneurship, skill for cultivation risk 
preference and commitment to cultivation, I conducted a detailed questionnaire survey 
among farmers, addressing questions about attitudes toward risk and village politics, 
willingness to adopt new techniques and impressions of People’s Communes for inclusion 
in W 15. I gauge the willingness of famers to acquire new agricultural techniques by farmers’ 
self-evaluation on an ordinal scale of 1–3, and the higher the number, the more willing they 
are. The variable of attitude toward risk is evaluated on a 1–3 scale (the more risk-loving 
they are, the larger the value), and the variable of sensitiveness to market information is 
                                                   
14 As shown in Heckman et al. (1997), one of the most important preconditions for implementing PSM 
is that both treated and comparison groups are drawn from the same market. The villages chosen in this 
study are geographically adjacent, and their products comprise the same brand of eggplant in wholesale 
markets. Statistical comparisons of the market price of eggplants between the villages using a t-test are 
not significant at the 10 % level for all cases. 
15 Ito et al. (2012) insist that image of the People’s Commune and distinction of old (People’s 
Commune) and new cooperative is one of the major key factors preventing farmers from joining an 
agricultural cooperative for fear of losing land utilization rights and farm management control. 
]1[]0[]0[]1[
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also measured on a 1–3 scale. Furthermore, the impression of the People’s Commune is a 
dummy variable which is 1 if the farmers were influenced by its image to make the decision 
about participation or non-participation in the cooperative, and 0 otherwise. 16 
The propensity score on program participation tends to be calculated using a 
parametric method, and I will adopt a Probit model for the estimations. The literature has 
developed several types of matching estimators, and a trade-off between bias and variance 
tends to arise among matching algorithms when the sample size is small (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008). Thus, to check the consistency of the estimations, I will adopt the 
matching algorithms of nearest-neighbor matching, radius matching with 05.0<− ji PP  
and kernel matching. 
Furthermore, the framework of the impact evaluation can be extended to vegetable 
cultivation if the definitions of iD  and iY  are adjusted properly. Namely, if iD  denotes a 
binary variable which equals 1 if the farmer engages in vegetable cultivation and 0 
otherwise, and iY  denotes net income from crop cultivation and total income per capita, 
then the impact of vegetable cultivation is estimated by ATT. In this estimation, it should be 
noticed that grain farmers are more willing to engage in off-farm occupations by their own 
choice to compensate for relatively low agricultural income. Therefore, the comparison of 
total income as well as agricultural income for vegetable and grain farmers is required to 
estimate the treatment effect. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of household characteristics for (1a) participants, 
(1b) non-participants, and (2) grain farmers. The variables that determine FPC participation 
as well as affect agricultural production are included in this table.  
No significant differences are observed between (a) and (b) for agricultural net income, 
labor days, area of farm land cultivated for vegetables, and agricultural capital, while some 
variables, such as total income, vegetable net income and total cultivated areas, for 
participants are significantly larger than those for non-participants. In addition, compared 
with non-participants, the size of contract farmland for participants is significantly larger, 
                                                   
16 Since a substantial lump sum investment is required to build a greenhouse, most farmers could not 
use their own savings or obtain a loan from banks and credit cooperatives. We prepared detailed 
questions on their financial status, and found that 88% of vegetable farmers obtained agricultural loans 
from financial institutions whereas 17% of grain farmers did. However, among non-borrowers of grain 
farmers, only 6 grain farmers replied that their loan applications were rejected or they did not submit an 
application due to fear of being rejected. Therefore, the possibility that grain farmers tend to be caught in 
credit constraint appears to be very low. In addition, since the variable of credit constraint is perfectly 
predicted for vegetable cultivation, I could not employ it as an independent variable for Probit analysis. 
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and the health index of household head and willingness to attend village meetings are also 
significantly higher, while the percentage of the old age dummy is significantly lower. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics by Farm Type 
 
In contrast, differences between (1) vegetable farmers and (2) grain farmers are much 
clearer. The final column of Table 4 indicates that the total and agricultural net incomes of 
group (1) are significantly higher than those of group (2). In addition, striking differences 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Total income per capita (yuan ) 8,175 7,203 9,466 8,418 6,652 5,092 5,098 3,691 2.280 ** 3.369 ***
Total income (yuan ) 30,324 18,552 33,356 17,876 26,746 18,841 21,993 20,847 2.073 ** 2.937 ***
        Agricultural net income (yuan ) 21,558 15,524 23,401 13,676 19,414 17,300 6,986 11,361 1.478 7.004 ***
        Vegetable net income (yuan ) 18,000 13,499 20,047 13,639 15,460 12,995 3,739 9,696 1.947 * 7.859 ***
    Income from off-farm ocupations (yuan ) 5,568 8,215 6,171 9,086 4,856 7,057 9,140 11,119 0.919 -2.616 ***
Total labor days (days ) 659 242 704 259 607 210 500 199 2.348 ** 4.765 ***
    Labor day for agricultural work (days ) 556 199 576 204 532 191 326 171 1.299 8.280 ***
        Labor day for vegetable cultivations (days ) 457 194 480 188 430 198 148 124 1.494
    Labor day for non-farm work (days ) 103 156 127 175 75 126 174 207 1.949 * -2.762 ***
Total cultivated farmland (mu ) 11.95 5.27 12.76 5.35 11.01 5.07 12.88 5.37 1.917 * -1.191
Cultivated farm land for vegetable (mu ) 4.61 1.95 4.53 1.88 4.70 2.03 -0.498
Dispersion of farm land (Simpson index ) 0.638 0.158 0.641 0.161 0.635 0.156 0.652 0.182 0.232 -0.572
Self-evaluation on period of contrancted farmland (1: less
than 30 years; 0: others) 0.083 0.056 0.115 0.250 -1.233 -3.354
***
Age of Household Head (HH) (years ) 46.2 8.8 46.4 8.9 46.1 8.8 52.8 11.2 0.160 -4.635 ***
Education  of HH (years of education ) 8.80 2.00 8.92 1.88 8.66 2.13 8.50 2.44 0.750 0.916
Health index of HH (1: bad; 2: relatively bad; 3: normal; 4:
relatively good; 5: good） 3.98 0.94 4.15 0.85 3.79 1.00 3.57 1.05 2.279
** 2.908 ***
Attitude toward risk (1: risk averse; 2: risk neutral; 3: risk
loving) 2.66 0.67 2.65 0.67 2.67 0.68 1.89 0.97 -0.165 6.667
***
Willingness to acquire new agricultural techniques  (1: less
willing; 2: ordinary; 3: very willing) 2.77 0.47 2.83 0.41 2.70 0.53 2.56 0.65 1.577 2.664
***
Self-evaluation of understanding of market trends (1: less
understanding; 2: ordinary; 3: more understanding) 1.79 0.74 1.82 0.78 1.75 0.70 1.72 0.68 0.507 0.641
Contracted farmland 7.98 2.63 8.44 2.66 7.45 2.50 7.98 3.22 2.187 ** -0.002
Household size 2.53 0.93 2.60 0.97 2.44 0.87 2.39 0.88 0.504 0.191
Agricultural capital 58,695 30,576 62,139 27,880 54,629 33,256 15,674 26,558 1.417 10.058 ***
Child dummy (1 if member under 5 years old within
household; 0 otherwise) 0.241 0.236 0.246 0.250 -0.131 -0.149
Old age dummy (1 if member over 70 years old within
household; 0 otherwise) 0.150 0.097 0.213 0.264 -1.874 -1.986
**
Impressions of the People's Commune (1:  influenced; 0:
not influenced to join FPC) 0.098 0.111 0.082 0.085 0.560 0.308
Willingness to attend villagers' meetings (1: less willing; 2:
ordinary; 3: more willing) 2.571 0.655 2.667 0.557 2.459 0.743 2.648 0.588 1.839
* -0.823
Cadre dummy 0.113 0.097 0.131 0.181 -0.613 -1.348
CCP dummy 0.060 0.083 0.033 0.083 1.219 -0.626
Willingness to help in the farming season (1: less willing; 2:
ordinary; 3: more willing) 1.872 0.830 1.903 0.825 1.836 0.840 1.915 0.841 0.461 -0.354
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
 (1) Vegetable Farmers  (2) Grain Famers t -Value
(a) vs. (b)
t -Value
(1) vs. (2)
(a) Participants (b) Non-participanmts
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between vegetable and grain farmers are observed not only for agricultural inputs such as 
labor days and agricultural capital but also for attitudes toward risk and new agricultural 
techniques. Regarding the variable of attitude toward risk, the results of the t-test indicate 
that vegetable farmers are more likely to be risk lovers. The same trend is observed for the 
variable of willingness to acquire new agricultural techniques: vegetable farmers are 
significantly more willing to adopt new techniques. Furthermore, the differences between 
groups (1) and (2) for the variables of age and health condition of the household head are 
significant, indicating that relatively younger and healthier household heads appear to 
become vegetable farmers. 
Summarizing the results, the differences in major variables between participants and 
non-participants are less striking than those between vegetable and grain farmers, indicating 
that the implementation of vegetable cultivation tends to be highly related to household 
characteristics as well as attitudes toward agricultural production. 
 
 
4. Estimating Results on Production Function and PSM 
4.1. Income Function 
Table 5 presents the results of crop cultivation and vegetable income functions from 
OLS and FIML. In estimating the income function, variables that represent household 
characteristics (age and educational level of household head), willingness to engage in 
agricultural production (attitude toward risk, adoption of agricultural new techniques, and 
self-evaluation of understanding of market trends), and village dummy are included as 
explanatory variables. The estimated results are mostly consistent between estimation 
procedures. Regarding the first stage of FIML estimation, the coefficient of willingness to 
attend village meetings is significantly positive for vegetable income but not for 
agricultural income. These results indicate that the more willing they are to attend village 
meetings, the more they would like to participate in FPCs concerning vegetable income. 
On the other hand, coefficients of the CCP dummy for crop cultivation and vegetable 
incomes are positive but not significant. In addition, the log-likelihood ratio test (LR test) 
for 0=ρ  ( ρ  denotes a coefficient of correlation between  and ) is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. These results suggest that the estimation procedure of OLS is 
statistically supported, and that the selection of whether farmers participate in FPCs appears 
to be performed according to observable characteristics of households.   
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Table 5 Estimated Results of Income Functions 
 
All coefficients of the FPC dummy are positive but not statistically significant, 
indicating that participation in FPCs does not enhance income from agricultural production. 
As examined in the previous section, this probably reflects the fact that the services 
provided by the FPCs in terms of marketing, unified purchasing, and instruction in 
vegetable cultivation techniques are not necessarily restricted to participants, so 
non-participants can also benefit from FPCs. Regarding other independent variables, the 
coefficient of agricultural capital is significantly positive both for crop cultivation and 
Simpson index 0.380 0.709 0.377 0.896 -0.166 -0.446 -0.186 -0.444
Health 0.072 1.013 0.072 0.955 0.079 1.001 0.076 1.040
Age 0.053 0.941 0.053 0.886 0.101 1.748 * 0.098 1.736 *
Age*Age -0.001 -1.132 -0.001 -1.028 -0.001 -1.973 * -0.001 -2.007 **
Education -0.107 -1.106 -0.107 -0.808 -0.179 -1.220 -0.177 -1.378
Education*Education 0.008 1.408 0.008 1.035 0.010 1.178 0.010 1.266
Attitude toward risk 0.160 1.598 0.160 1.717 * 0.086 1.069 0.084 0.929
Willingness to acquire new agricultural techniques 0.061 0.473 0.060 0.455 0.107 0.814 0.103 0.805
Self-evaluation on understandings market trend 0.154 1.992 ** 0.153 1.838 * 0.078 0.883 0.073 0.893
FPC dummy 0.187 1.252 0.247 0.646 0.212 1.637 0.474 1.066
Contracted farmland 0.036 1.553 0.036 1.392 0.045 1.902 * 0.045 1.796 *
Total worker -0.024 -0.387 -0.025 -0.365 0.044 0.654 0.040 0.619
Agricultural capital 8.02E-06 3.472 *** 8.05E-06 3.779 *** 9.36E-06 3.519 *** 9.47E-06 4.807 ***
Village dummy 0.102 0.619 0.103 0.701 0.173 1.045 0.178 1.247
Constant 6.823 4.728 *** 6.816 4.187 *** 6.333 3.982 *** 6.297 3.991 ***
First Stage
   Willingness to attend villagers' meetings 0.254 1.456 0.290 * 1.682
   CCP dummy 0.975 1.630 0.959 1.632
   ath(ρ) -0.060 -0.166 -0.271 -0.611
Number of observations
F-Value
Wald χ2
R-squared
Root MSE
LR test for ρ＝0
Source : Author’s Estimation from farm household survey.
Notes : 1) *** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
            2) Standard error of the coefficients are adjusted by Huber–White method.
 5.96***
48.59***
 4.97***
Vegetable net income
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
127
0.333
0.668
0.566
OLS FIML
z-Value z-Value
126 126
55.49***
Agricultiral net income
0.297
0.686
0.876
OLS FIML
z-Value z-Value
127
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vegetable incomes, whereas coefficients of self-evaluation of understanding market trends 
and contracted farmland are significantly positive for crop cultivation and vegetable 
incomes, respectively. Coefficients of ages have significant inverse-U shape relationship for 
vegetable income.   
 
4.2. Probit Model for Matching 
Next, I will calculate the propensity score with three types of Probit model to confirm 
the effects of income enhancement through FPC participation as well as implementation of 
vegetable cultivation. As shown above, since unobservable characteristics of households do 
not necessarily affect the decision to participate in FPCs, it appears that the adoption of 
PSM procedures that assumes selection is performed on observables can be justified. 
Concerning the participation in FPCs, I will estimate the Probit model for whether a farmer 
participates in the FPC, and the observations will be restricted to the vegetable-producing 
farmers [Case (A)]. Whereas, an estimation of the Probit model for whether a famer 
engages in vegetable cultivation will be also performed for all observations including grain 
farmers [Case (B)]. A wide range of explanatory variables, which represent farmers’ 
attributes as well as attitudes toward agricultural production and public works, are included 
in the Probit model to deduce more reliable estimators. 
Table 6 reports the estimated results of the Probit models. Compared with the results 
of Case (A), the frequencies of significant variables for Case (B) are higher, and according 
to the value of Pseudo R2, the fitness of the Probit model for Case (B) appears to be 
superior. These results imply that the distinction between vegetable and grain farmers is 
more apparent than that between participants and non-participants. The coefficients of 
health index and old age dummy are significantly positive and negative, respectively, for 
both cases. Namely, healthier households are inclined to participate in FPCs or initiate 
vegetable cultivation, whereas households who have aged members are less likely. 
The result of Case (A), that famers in the village cadre are less likely to participate in 
the FPCs, is unexpected as the FPCs in the surveyed areas were established through strong 
support from the village committees. This result might be related to free-rider behavior by 
village cadres, as they are familiar with the non-exclusivity of FPCs’ services. Also, the 
cadres of village committees tend to have little time to engage in vegetable cultivation 
because they are required to deal with the daily work of the village committee and the 
FPCs.  
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Table 6 Estimated Results of the Probit Models  
 
As for Case (B), the coefficients of age have a significant inverse-U shaped 
relationship with the introduction of vegetable cultivation and FPC participation. While, the 
coefficient of the time on contracted farmland is significantly negative, suggesting that 
household heads who perceive their farmland contract as being relatively insecure are less 
willing to implement vegetable cultivation. This result is consistent with previous studies 
that show insecure land transfer rights discouraged farmers from investing in agriculture 
Age -0.049 -0.385 0.379 3.089 ***
Age*Age 0.001 0.471 -0.004 -3.164 ***
Education 0.154 0.536 0.122 0.521
Education*Education -0.006 -0.373 -0.006 -0.404
Cadre dummy -0.900 -1.835 * -0.025 -0.057
CCP dummy 1.042 1.538 -0.253 -0.458
Health index 0.302 2.045 ** 0.267 1.733 *
Contracted Land -0.002 -0.006 0.226 1.177
Contracted land*Contracted land 0.007 0.416 -0.012 -1.109
Number of household member -0.037 -0.300 0.172 1.604
Attitude toward risk 0.016 0.084 0.268 1.909 *
Self-evaluation on period of contracted farmland -0.420 -0.913 -0.670 -1.990 **
Willingness to help at the farming season 0.102 0.657 -0.081 -0.551
Willingness to acquire new agricultural techniques 0.335 1.239 0.730 2.947 ***
Self-evaluation on understandings market trend -0.043 -0.235 -0.075 -0.404
Child dummy 0.184 0.543 -0.309 -1.009
Old age dummy -0.694 -1.780 * -0.804 -2.191 **
Impressions to the People's Commune 0.345 0.822 0.521 1.012
Willingness to attend villagers' meetings 0.208 1.052 -0.124 -0.609
Village dummy -0.203 -0.646 1.471 4.908 ***
Constant -2.805 -0.794 -13.457 -3.874 ***
Number of  observations
Log Likelihood
LR χ2(19)
Pseudo R2
Source : Author’s Estimation from farm household survey.
Notes: 1) *** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
194
           2) Case (A) consists of (a) participants and (b) non-participants, and a dependent variable is whether a farmer is a FPC participant.
               Case (B) consists of vegetable farmers and grain farmers, and a dependent variable is whether a farmer is a vegetable cultivator.
26.2 94.55***
0.145 0.387
-77.39 -75.02
131
Case (A) Case (B)
coefficient z-Value coefficient z-Value
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(Carter and Yao 1999, Li, et al. 1998 and Jacoby et al. 2002). Furthermore, the coefficients 
of attitude toward risk as well as willingness to acquire new agricultural techniques are 
significantly positive, indicating that more risk-loving and motivated farmers tend to 
engage in vegetable cultivation. 
 
4.3. Estimating PSM Results 
Based on the propensity score calculated from the Probit models, PSMs are conducted 
over the region of common support where the distributions of propensity scores overlap 
between treatment and untreated groups. Table 7 summarizes the results for the treatment 
effect in each case. The treatment effect in Case (A) is evaluated in terms of income per 
capita as well as agricultural and vegetable net incomes, whereas those in Case (B) are 
measured by income per capita and agricultural net income. In addition, the treatment 
effects are measured in terms of labor income and unit area of cultivated land because the 
ATT with PSM cannot control for differences in inputs among farmers except for the 
propensity score17,18. 
As shown for Case (A) in Table 7, while significant differences between participants 
and non-participants are observed in several cases before matching, few significant 
treatment effects are observed after matching. More specifically, no significant treatment 
effects are observed with regard to total income and agricultural net income regardless of 
matching methods, and almost the same results are observed for vegetable net income. 
These results are consistent with the estimations of the income function, indicating that 
participation in an FPC has no significant impact on increasing agricultural income for 
vegetable farmers. However, it should be noticed that the direct impact of participation on 
vegetable net income are slightly more positive, but not necessarily significant, when using 
kernel and radius matching.  
In contrast, the estimated results of Case (B), which compares the treatment effects 
between vegetable and grain farmers, are more obvious. Specifically, the treatment effects 
on income per capita and agricultural net income are significantly positive, except for 
agricultural net income when using nearest-neighbor matching. As shown in Table 4, the 
                                                   
17 The estimated results of the balance test on variables utilized for Probit model show that the average 
amounts of all variables do not differ significantly between treated and untreated groups at the 10% level 
in each case.  
18 I also estimated ATT of agricultural net income per agricultural capital. Since the standard deviation 
of agricultural capital and agricultural net income for grain farmers are considerably large (see Table 4), 
the estimated results of agricultural capital appear to be caught in low statistical power. Therefore, those 
outcomes are not included in Table 7.  
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average income of grain farmers from off-farm occupations is significantly higher than that 
of vegetable farmers; however, the agricultural income of vegetable farmers thoroughly 
compensates for the gap, giving a significantly higher income for vegetable farmers. The 
treatment effects on total and agricultural incomes when using kernel matching are 2801 
and 2001 yuan/person, respectively, which are 53.1% and 58.0% higher than those of grain 
farmers. In addition, treatment effects on agricultural income per unit area of cultivated 
land are more than double those for grain farmers, while those for income per unit labor 
input are positive but not significant for all cases. These results suggest that vegetable 
cultivation enhances land productivity but requires more labor input, thus resulting in 
relatively low labor productivity.  
 
Table 7 Estimated Results of Treatment Effect in Each Case 
 
 
Combined with the results of the parametric estimations, I can summarize that FPC 
participation does not necessarily improve agricultural and vegetable net incomes for 
vegetable farmers regardless of controlling observable and unobservable factors. On the 
other hand, the estimation of the treatment effect reveals that the implementation of 
vegetable cultivation significantly increases total and agricultural incomes by the adoption 
of more labor-intensive and land productivity enhancing varieties. Therefore, rather than 
the decision to participate in FPCs, the decision to commence to engage in more specialized 
Treated Untreated Gap Treated Untreated Gap Treated Untreated Gap Treated Untreated Gap
Case (A): participants vs. vegetable cultivating non-participants
     Income per capita 9,133 6,652 2,481 2.09 ** 8,616 7,178 1,437 1.10 8,616 6,897 1,719 1.22 8,616 7,356 1,260 0.96
     Agricultural net income 
             per capita 6,371 4,937 1,434 1.51 6,003 5,184 819 0.74 6,003 5,224 779 0.67 6,003 5,267 736 0.67
             per cultivated land (mu ) 5,665 4,235 1,430 2.20 ** 5,566 4,557 1,009 1.30 5,566 4,896 670 0.78 5,566 4,528 1,038 1.34
             per labor input 72.14 61.89 10.24 0.41 72.19 63.07 9.12 0.34 72.19 51.88 20.31 0.85 72.19 65.48 6.71 0.25
     Vegetable net income
             per capita 5,365 3,992 1,373 1.73 * 5,284 3,751 1,533 1.53 5,284 3,549 1,735 1.88 * 5,284 3,790 1,494 1.50
             per cultivated land 1,781 1,739 42 0.14 1,820 1,494 326 0.76 1,820 1,440 380 0.76 1,820 1,510 310 0.73
             per labor input 37.40 32.31 5.08 0.95 36.19 27.85 8.33 1.11 36.19 26.45 9.74 1.80 * 36.19 28.34 7.85 1.06
Case (B): vegetable cultivating farmers vs. grain farmers 
     Income per capita 7,987 5,064 2,922 3.16 *** 8,073 5,272 2,801 2.33 ** 8,073 5,398 2,675 2.16 *** 8,156 5,305 2,851 2.34 **
     Agricultural net income 
             per capita 5,703 2,093 3,610 4.76 *** 5,451 3,450 2,001 1.92 * 5,451 3,963 1,487 1.24 5,451 3,614 1,837 1.74 *
             per cultivated land (mu ) 4,999 1,492 3,507 6.82 *** 5,038 2,155 2,884 4.54 *** 5,038 2,376 2,663 3.63 *** 5,038 2,120 2,918 4.54 ***
             per labor input 67.45 57.59 9.86 0.50 76.19 72.01 4.18 0.15 76.19 74.70 1.49 0.05 76.19 71.40 4.79 0.17
Notes: 1) *** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
           2) Case (A) consists of (a) participants and (b) non-participants, and a dependent variable is whether a farmer is a FPC participant.
               Case (B) consists of vegetable farmers and grain farmers, and a dependent variable is whether a farmer is a vegetable cultivator.
t -value t -value t -value t -value
Before Matching After Matching
Kernel matching Nearest-neighbor matching Radius matching
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vegetable cultivation is more important to enhance farmers’ agricultural as well as total 
incomes.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigated the effect on agricultural income of FPC participation as well 
as the adoption of vegetable cultivation. While policy support from central and local 
governments to establish FPCs has been intensified to improve rural peoples’ welfare, the 
existing literature on FPCs does not focus on the endogeneity of farmers participation in 
FPCs and the effects of switching from traditional varieties (or traditional cultivating 
techniques) to relatively new ones. Therefore, a simple comparison between the 
participants and non-participants appears to misevaluate the functions of FPCs, and the 
comparison between adopters and non-adopters of new varieties is required to identify 
adoption effects. In this study, I selected two vegetable-producing villages of Xinjiang in 
Shanxi province to estimate the treatment effects through parametric and nonparametric 
approaches. 
The estimated results of treatment effects can be summarized as follows. First, no 
significant difference between participants and non-participants regarding agricultural and 
vegetable incomes can be observed in either parametric or nonparametric estimations. This 
outcome is closely related to the features of management adopted by the FPCs. Specifically, 
the FPCs were established with great support from village committees, thus the services 
provided by the FPCs are not restricted to participants, meaning non-participants can also 
enjoy the services provided by the FPCs at no cost. This externality of FPCs’ services 
enables non-participants to realize a higher vegetable income approximately that is 
equivalent to that of participants.  
Second, a comparison between vegetable and grain farmers regarding total and 
agricultural incomes reveals that the treatment effects of vegetable cultivation on total 
income are significantly positive regardless of matching procedures, although no significant 
difference is observed for agricultural labor productivity. These results indicate that the 
implementation of vegetable cultivation itself requires more labor-intensive efforts but 
contributes to the enhanced total economic welfare of its adopters. Furthermore, land tenure 
insecurity and attitudes toward vegetable cultivation risk appear to be major impediments to 
the introduction of relatively uncertain but more lucrative products. 
These findings suggest that profound examinations of the services provided by FPCs 
and the externalities to non-participants are crucial to accurately evaluate the impact of FPC 
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participations. On the other hand, policy support for potential vegetable farmers, such as the 
provision of agricultural loans and technical training, seems a promising measure to 
facilitate vegetable cultivation. In addition, this technical training for grain farmers appears 
to be effective to let them become agricultural laborers to be employed by other vegetable 
farmers, enhancing their agricultural wage income as well as strengthening the divisions of 
labor in the village as a whole. Furthermore, the intensification of farmland tenure security 
by central and local governments would contribute to grain farmers being more inclined to 
undertake riskier agricultural investment, such as constructing greenhouses, as well as to 
facilitate farmland transaction among farmers. 
In early stages of agro-industrialization, the easy access to FPC membership and the 
non-excludability of non-participants from the FPC’s services depicted in this study appear 
to contribute to vegetable-producing agglomeration in less-developed areas. However, with 
the advancement of vegetable cultivation and the intensification of competition among 
vegetable-producing areas, the formalization of FPC management and the imposition of 
strict qualifications to participate in FPCs will be required to produce high-quality products 
as well as to achieve sustainable agricultural development. 
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